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    <title>sensitive information disclosure on Florence Njeri</title>
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      <title>Sensitive Information Disclosure Through Side-Channel Information Leakage in Agents</title>
      <link>https://florencenjeri.com/posts/advanced-level-1-context-gateway-leak/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      
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      <description>Level 1: The Context Gateway # This challenge was about finding a hidden config value that the agent leaked through its own diagnostic and logging tools. Instead of guessing or brute forcing the value, I used the monitoring tools against the agent to get it to print the exact internal setting needed to unlock the flag.
The exploit and Result : Side-Channel Information Leakage # Step 1: Reconnaissance of the exposed tools
Level 1 exposed three tools: view_system_logs, discover_services (with scan modes network, process, verbose, and custom), and multi_tool_use.parallel.
I started by asking the model what tools it had access to and how they worked:</description>
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